Analysis of Factors to Promote Historical Reconciliation between Japan and Korean Peninsula after the Cold War 

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　This paper analyzes post-cold-war diplomatic changes in East Asia as historical reconciliation made progress among the governments through the “Japan–South Korea Joint Declaration of 1998” and the “Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration”. These two declarations were turning-points in settling outstanding issues related to past unfortunate events between Japan and the Korean peninsula. Japan and South Korea adopted the former declaration as both countries recognized the necessity of, and benefits from, strategic cooperation to promote Regionalism in East Asia. The Kim Dae-jung administration required financial support from Japan to proceed with Sunshine Policy (South Korea policy of engagement with North Korea) and to deal with the Asian Financial Crisis. Japan, meanwhile, made progress with the “1997 Guidelines” and with legislation dealing with military emergencies in event of a Korean crisis; building trilateral security cooperation was an important factor among Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., but was felt especially to enhance the Japan-U.S. alliance. Prime minister Obuchi’s expression of remorse and heartfelt apology for Japan’s colonial rule, and clear naming of the South Korea state in a diplomatic statement for the first time, were instrumental in advancing the process of historical reconciliation.  

　On the North Korea side, the Sunshine Policy of appeasement, increased perception of a U.S. threat, and domestic economic reforms became factors in closing the gap in mutual interests that existed in Japan-North Korea relations. The Kim Dae-jung administration assisted Japanese diplomacy to have proactive negotiations with North Korea, a far departure from previous administrations which demanded the “South-North balance theory” for Japan. After 9.11, North Korea recognized a higher threat of aggression from the U.S., which now justified pre-emptive attacks on enemy countries holding weapons of mass destruction. Also, North Korea needed a massive foreign capital inflow quickly, to reform its economics on a large scale. These factors contributed to North Korea’s entrance into the later declaration, using a method of economic cooperation between Japan and North Korea. Rather than employing the traditional approach of “diplomatic normalization first, the abduction issue last,” the two chose an approach of “comprehensive conclusion,” which included historical issues in its context.